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The Politics of Dramaturgy 
John Lutterbie 
The Dramaturg in mainstream American theatre is perceived, in perhaps 
the most positive light, as a facilitator. That is someone who moves among 
playwrights, directors, producers, designers, actors and spectators providing 
information, opinion and making sure that the lines of communication remain open 
and constructive. There seems little room for politics in this structure; gone are the 
days when Martin Esslin could proclaim with confidence that the dramaturg was 
"the conscience of the theatre." Indeed I suspect that the dramaturg is thought to 
be the most apolitical of people, needing to maintain an uncommitted position in 
order to insure the confidence of the production team, even to the extent of staying 
aloof of office politics. This is not surprising, particularly in a country where 
politics are associated primarily with elected officials, political correctness and 
identity politics. Besides to acknowledge being political would immediately 
compromise the objectivity the Dramaturg is expected to maintain in working on 
a production, and return to the mouth a distaste often associated with didacticism 
and the political theatre of the 1960s. 
While claims about being objective and apolitical are comfortable and 
self-validating, it is a position that is difficult to maintain in the face of more recent 
and complicated concepts of the political. I want to discuss these expanded 
definitions of politics, to show how they force us to re-evaluate the traditional idea 
of the dramaturg, and to suggest how this revision of the dramaturges role relates 
to the social and cultural politics of our time. But I am going to take an indirect 
route to the subject by using an aspect of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's discourse on 
space to establish how the context in which dramaturgs work necessarily influences 
the production. 
In The Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty discusses the 
perception of space using the image of two squares linked by diagonal lines (see 
figure 1). In this figure there are two squares ABCD and EFGH with lines 
connecting the corners of the two squares, and additional diagonals AD and EH. 
Merleau-Ponty observes that if you focus on the square ABCD you see a cube 
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from underneath, while if you shift focus to the square EFGH you see a cube from 
above. He argues that neither is preferable or natural, that it depends on where 
your gaze comes to rest. Furthermore, should you focus first on the small square 
defined by corners C and F, you do not get a cube at all, but a mosaic made of 
squares and triangles. The point being that although the image remains the same, 
the order in which we perceive it alters what we see. 
Merleau-Ponty goes on to argue that the ability to perceive depth is 
determined by the context in which we see the object: "so the perception of 
distance can be understood only as a being in the distance which links up with 
being where it appears."2 In this essay Figure 1 appears in a two dimensional world 
of paper and ink, which in turn is set against your peripheral awareness of the space 
in which you are presently reading. This combined experience allows you to 
imagine depth in the drawing, which is in reality as two-dimensional as the words 
printed on the paper. If the drawing were to be seen outdoors, say in a field or in 
the woods without the surrounding text, it would appear very different and require 
an effort to see it as representing a three-dimensional object. Patrick Heelan 
discusses an experiment using Van Gogh's famous painting of the bedroom at 
Aries.3 In the picture the shutters on the window are closed causing us to read the 
relation of the chair, the bed, the painting on the wall and floor in a particular way. 
A copy of the painting was made but in this instance the shutters were open and the 
landscape outside the window visible. The additional information completely 
altered the experience of the painting, requiring a re-evaluation of how the objects 
relate and making the viewer more aware of the ways in which the perspective has 
been distorted in the original painting. Our experience is altered by the context in 
which objects appear. 
The radical shift in context in this example makes us conscious of how we 
construct images and that what we see to be the truth of the object is the effect of 
the perspective and the distortions in Van Gogh's painting. Similarly with the 
drawing in Figure 1, the appearance of depth on the page compared to its flatness 
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when seen outdoors indicates that where we see the drawing effects our 
interpretation of it. When perceived without comparison, what we see appears to 
be how the drawing is in reality and leads us to believe that there is only one way 
to look at it. Attributes that define an object and make it appear natural are, for 
Merleau-Ponty, the result of activity on the part of the perceiver. There is in the 
perceiving mechanism a process that allows us to see depth in the drawing, to give 
in to an illusion. "Depth is born beneath my gaze because the latter tries to see 
something."* What we see in the realm of objects is not the objects as they are but 
the effect of what we are trying to see. What we see when we look at the drawing 
or the painting are our attempts to make sense of the perceptual experience in a 
particular context. To find ourselves looking up at a cube, looking down on it, or 
seeing a mosaic rather than a cube tells us something about how we organize the 
world and ourselves in relation to it. I am not trying to assign a deep psychological 
significance to the experience, rather quite simply to suggest that when we look at 
the world we organize it based on our experiences, and that people who have had 
different experiences will organize it differently. "To experience a structure is not 
to receive it into oneself passively; it is to live it, to take it up, assume it and 
discover its immanent significance."5 However, as the optical illusion implies, the 
"immanent significance" is determined by the perceiver in the process of taking up 
the structure rather than the unveiling of an inherent meaning. 
Merleau-Ponty's description of the perception of depth seems to me an apt 
metaphor for the experience of working in the theatre. For example, when reading 
a play we do not locate meaning in the text, rather we seek out coordinates and use 
them to construct an interpretation of the text. The more familiar the coordinates 
supplied by the playwright, the more confident we feel about our understanding of 
the play. On the other hand, if the playwright uses conventions that are unfamiliar, 
we are more likely to find the play inaccessible or irritating because it appears to 
be meaningless. Anyone of a certain age will remember how opaque Samuel 
Beckett's Waiting for Godot seemed to be or, more recently, Heiner Miiller's 
Hamletmachine. This is not because these plays are any more or less meaningful, 
but because the coordinates in the text do not allow us to construct the play in the 
usual way. It is only when we are able to identify the new points of reference that 
we can navigate the complexities of these texts to arrive at an understanding. The 
fact that these two scripts are now more or less accessible indicates the degree to 
which we have become familiar with the conventions of Beckett's existentialism 
or Miiller's post-structuralist aesthetics. Qualities in the plays that used to be 
obscure have now become identifiable coordinates. 
Of equal significance however is the fact that there is a "usual" way of 
reading plays. Every period has sets of conventions that determine a dominant 
mode of interpreting texts. There can be little doubt that in this country realism is 
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the predominate form of playwriting. We are all capable of reading realism quickly 
and accurately, perhaps not for the details and subtleties of the play, but for the 
overall sense and the uniqueness of the author's voice. That this was not always 
the case is evident in the initial response of Stanislavski to Chekov's The Seagull. 
His initial lack of faith in the play and the ongoing discussions between Chekhov 
and Stanislavski about whether the play was a drama or a comedy indicate the 
difficulties encountered. Similarly the cast's uncertainty about how the audience 
would respond—their bated breaths backstage while they waited to learn the fate 
of their performance—suggests that there was grave concern over the accessibility 
of the text. While Chekhov's plays remain a challenge today it is less because they 
cannot be understood rather than our ability to bring the characters to life and the 
audience's willingness to encounter the texts, which have garnered a certain 
negative reputation for heaviness. 
The issue of context and its effect on the work of the dramaturg extends 
further than the conventions surrounding interpretation. In every period there 
develops a certain "theatre culture" that determines, in part, which plays are more 
likely to be performed, and the risks taken when the boundaries of the envelope of 
convention are pushed. By "theatre culture" I mean a complex system of 
relationships defined by audience expectations, aesthetics, conventions, modes of 
theatre training, institutional structures, economic factors, promotional and 
reviewing strategies, and the position of theatre as part of a larger socio-cultural 
matrix. Attempts to grasp the theatre culture at any time are further complicated 
by the simultaneous existence of multiple types of theatres. There will be certain 
forms that are dominant and others that assume a marginal position. Today, for 
instance, it is possible to differentiate between mainstream and avant-garde, 
between theatre and various forms of performance art, between profit and non-
profit theatres, between regional houses and theatres for communities. Each of 
these lay claim to a certain position in the theatre culture and are patronized by a 
certain portion of the theatre going population. Regional theatres, for instance, 
appeal to a broad range of the educated, upper and middle class people, who are 
interested in attending and supporting a particular building that offers a specific 
type of theatre. The theatre is usually a proscenium house seating between five 
hundred and a thousand patrons, who expect to see shows that are accessible, 
entertaining while moderately challenging intellectually and emotionally, and that 
do not seriously question fundamental humanist beliefs. The aesthetics are 
typically based in psychological realism, whether it is Shakespeare, Molière, 
Brecht, Williams or Shepard. A certain degree of technological sophistication is 
desirable as an enhancement of the experience, whether it is hydraulic scenery, 
multi-media, or hyperrealism. The production team that makes up the company 
consists of people who support this type of endeavor. 
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Theatres-for-communities will generally work with more specific 
audiences located in a particular neighborhood and appeal to a very different 
population. The building will be considerably more modest, and will often serve 
as a headquarters for a more nomadic type of existence. The production values will 
be considerably lower in terms of technology, while the acting will focus more on 
fulfilling tasks rather than creating fully developed psychological characters. 
Generally the company creates the plays, or when previously produced texts are 
used they will be adapted to relate to the concerns of the audience. The audience 
is either uncertain what to expect or expect to be entertained by a performance 
about issues that are central to the concerns of the community. Indeed, in these 
theatres members of the community will frequently have a say in what is 
performed, an option seldom available to patrons of regional theatres. 
Clearly a dramaturg working in these two venues undertakes different 
responsibilities, requiring different kinds of commitment. Although many of the 
tasks will be identical and the end of each is the same, which is to produce quality 
theatre for the audience, the objective in undertaking work in these two theatres 
varies (although this is true for all forms). Without privileging one over the other, 
it is clear that the two types of theatre are based on a different set of values, indeed 
that what separates any two theatres is the system of beliefs about what constitutes 
the function and quality of theatre. 
It is precisely at this point, where the context of the theatre defines both 
its purpose and aesthetics, that the question of politics needs to be raised. In 
thinking through the example discussed above there is a tendency to assume that 
doing theatre in and for a community is political, while working in regional theatre 
is not. Similarly, it is generally presumed that if you are doing Brecht you are 
engaged in political theatre, and that if you are working on Chekov you are not. 
Recent theories of politics and ideology, particularly those of Louis Althusser and 
Michel Foucault, call these assumptions into question. Thinking about the question 
of politics in contemporary society has led away from black and white distinctions 
to claim that virtually all activity is implicated in the realm of the political. 
Louis Althusser bases his approach to politics and ideology in Karl Marx. 
For Marx ideology is false consciousness, or a set of beliefs that conceal what he 
called the "real" conditions of existence. These beliefs and values veil the "true" 
relations of production, naturalize the ownership of the means of production by a 
few, and mystify the working class as to the cause of their "oppression." Marx's 
concept had a certain validity in the early stages of capitalism. However, this 
definition seems somewhat outdated when attempting to apply it to late capitalism 
where the owners of the means of production are as likely to be working class 
shareholders whose investments guarantee an easier life after retirement as the "big 
bosses." Althusser began to rethink the problem of ideology and how it works in 
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a society where classes can be defined vertically, as well as horizontally.6 For 
example, the educated class cuts through all strata of society in a way that 
economics does not. The question Althusser posed himself was: how do we 
account for the production and reproduction of "false consciousness" in a society 
where economic differences are no longer adequate to account for the adoption of 
values that justify inequalities? He noted that in any society there are two forms 
of coercion. One is direct repression, typified by state police forces, while the other 
operates subliminally, such as education. It was the latter that interested him. 
To explain the process of indirect coercion, Althusser borrowed a key 
concept from another Frenchman, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan.7 Working out 
of a Freudian context, Lacan was interested in the development of subjectivity 
particularly, in this instance, in the infant. His work suggested that there is a 
moment in the life of children when they recognize themselves as separate beings. 
He called this moment the "mirror stage" because becoming aware of a distinct self 
necessitates the development of an image of oneself as different from the world. 
Lacan believed that this process occurs when the child sees an image of him/herself 
reflected back by the world, as if in a mirror. This act of recognizing the self as 
separate from others gives the child the first inklings of a self-identity, which 
becomes in the words of Lacan an imago. The imago is both an image of the self 
and a representation of how society perceives the child. While it separates us from 
the world, it also connects us to it because the image becomes our key to 
understanding the proximity of our self-image to the ways in which we are 
perceived in the outside world. The strength of our self-esteem is, in some ways, 
based on our confidence that the way see ourselves is identical to the way we are 
seen by others. For Lacan, this image is never a "true" representation, but a 
likeness that provides a sense of wholeness quite different from the frequent 
experience of the self as a fragmented being. Furthermore, the experience of the 
self is never completely identical to the imago, because the image continually 
changes throughout life as we have new experiences and see ourselves reflected 
back in different circumstances. Therefore the distance between the imago and 
experience of the self never disappears but remains a haunting measure of 
difference. The image is nevertheless seductive, holding out a promise that we may 
become the person we would like to be. 
For Althusser, ideology works in much the same way. When we come 
into contact with an institution it "hails" us. When hailed, or interpellated as 
Althusser calls it, we see ourselves reflected in the institution and, depending on 
the degree to which what we see approximates or offers a positive image of 
ourselves, we align ourselves with that institution or not. When we answer the 
"hailing," that is say "yes" to the invitation to join, we also accept and adopt the 
values and beliefs, the structures and organizing principles, of that institution 
Soring 1999 133 
because they are part of what guarantees the image. If we want to continue to see 
ourselves reflected in a way that is pleasurable, we must behave in ways that keep 
a positive relationship with the institution, despite the fact that it is not always in 
our best self-interest. 
The process outlined by Althusser says several things about ideology. 
First, ideology is "invisible" in that it becomes incorporated as part of our 
subjectivity through interactions with others. In establishing relations with others 
we privilege certain beliefs and values as by-products of making that connection. 
Peer pressure is an example of this. Second, we can reject certain ideologies when 
they come into conflict with our self-image, even turn away from institutions with 
which we have had enduring relationships. Three, we may resist certain modes of 
being because we reject the values and beliefs associated with that position. Four, 
turning away from one ideology does not mean that we are ideologically 
independent or free. Every turning away from one system of values is turning 
towards another. The implication of the latter is that we are limited by the 
ideologies available to us, and we are never outside of ideology. There is always 
a system of institutional beliefs in which we are implicated. 
We can never know completely what our ideology is, but we can get a 
glimpse of its outlines by taking the time to analyze our place in the theatre culture. 
The theatres we work for, the kind of plays we prefer, our relationships with other 
members of the theatre community and our attitudes to the audience are some of 
the areas that can help us to understand the parameters of our personal politics. 
The value of this investigation is that it provides clarity. An understanding of our 
personal ideologies helps us become aware of our preferences. Preferences are 
both inevitable and necessary because they define who we are and provide a 
position that allows us to interact with the world in a coherent way. However they 
also define limits by acting as filters that cause us to accept or reject that which 
does not fit the profiles of our ideological positions. Knowledge of how we 
position ourselves in the theatre culture can help us to understand why we like or 
dislike certain plays, and how we relate to the organizations where we work. It can 
increase our sensitivity to those with whom we work, permitting us to construct 
more positive relationships, or at least helping us to understand why tensions exist. 
It can give us a new language for resolving conflicts and enhancing 
communications, new ways of reading plays, of interacting with actors and 
directors in rehearsal. 
Pragmatically, dramaturgs do not always have a choice about where to 
work. It is certainly a small job market and keeping food on the table is not 
insignificant. We are frequently put in the position of supporting work with which 
we find ourselves at odds. Being overtly aware of the differences in ideological 
positions may seem to make our work less bearable. But we may ask whether it is 
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preferable to know why we are discontent or to endure the subliminal unhappiness 
that attends unconscious conflicts. Moreover, knowing the differences between our 
politics and those of the workplace gives us a vantage point from which to work for 
change and to know better the degree to which we can argue for new ways of doing 
things. Knowledge of the political differences between ourselves and the 
institution allows us to see the situation more clearly and to define more 
sophisticated strategies for addressing what we perceive to be untenable positions. 
Theatre is a way of coming to a better understanding of the human 
condition, of confronting our humanity. This act is inevitably political because 
through the rhetoric of the theatre we are encouraging others to accept the values 
set forth in performance. If we are interpellated into institutions, then the public 
acts in which we engage are "hailing" others, encouraging them to accept the 
system of beliefs implicit in the theatre we make. Should we not be aware of what 
those values are? Dramaturgs are not the conscience of the theatre. But that does 
not mean we should not ask questions, rather it is our responsibility to define and 
grapple with the implications of the values we communicate. Like all efforts at 
self-analysis, the process can be painful and difficult, because we will inevitably 
come to the point at which we encounter contradiction—that moment when we 
realize we hold values that are incompatible with each other. This is a humbling 
experience that has the salutary effect of compelling us to resist dogmatic positions 
and to listen with greater care to the positions of others. This, in turn, opens us to 
new possibilities that may just allow us to act for change when we perceive it to be 
necessary, to be more creative through opening alternative perspectives and help 
us to facilitate communication between others more effectively. In short, it may 
help us to be better advocates for good theatre and more effective dramaturgs. 
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